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Abstract 
Introduction. The acquisition of the Cuatro and La sexta television networks by Telecinco and 
Antena 3, respectively, has configured a new audiovisual landscape in Spain. The two new media 
platforms, now known as Mediaset España and Atresmedia, have accumulated considerable power in 
the free-to-air television market in terms of revenue, audience configuration and advertising sales 
figures. The objective of this article is to analyse the causes of these mergers, their influence on the 
Spanish television market, and to establish whether they put at risk -in terms of “relevant markets”- 
the survival of other players. Method. The study is based on the principles of the political economy 
of communication, which provides an integrated theoretical framework focused on media ownership 
and concentration. Results and conclusions. The overall conclusion is that, since 2010, when the 
first concentration deal was closed, the conditions of competition of the Spanish audiovisual market 
have been modified.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Although the television value chain is experiencing great mutations, “television is neither dead nor 
dying, it is only entering, gradually, new phases without leaving behind many elements from the 
past” (López Villanueva, 2011: 9). Although, in the Internet era, the television business has been 
reduced substantially and is increasingly unstable, the broadcasting model still has sufficient 
weapons (large audiences and acceptable advertising revenue) to fight a fight that, after the 
digitisation and the emergence of the Internet, it no longer dominates.  
  
Meanwhile, and in the mid-term, television companies recur to concentration as a strategy to adapt 
themselves to an increasingly fragmented market, to distribute income among a smaller number of 
operators and even to carry out practices that go against legal and fair competition. But the main 
problem is that in the future they will not be able to guarantee income on the new distribution 
channels (Álvarez Monzoncillo, 2011: 238). 
  
Thus, the rapid developments in technology and the changes in consumer habits are altering the 
television landscape. While Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), thanks to the development of digital 
interactive applications, is testing new forms of communication to distribute TV content direct into 
individual households rather than mass audiences (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 2), commercial 
television is still looking to maximise audiences and generate more value to increase advertising 
revenues. 
  
On the other hand, and in a context of severe economic recession, there has been also a strong 
economic and financial devaluation in the media sector. As Campos Freire (2013: 23) highlights, the 
stock market price of the leading media groups undergoing strong oscillations of their risk premium 
in Europe –including Spain– has decreased 70% between 2007 and 2011. Thus, these companies 
have had to adopt new strategic decisions which have altered their shareholding composition, by 
making new partners or simply promoting –when the law of the country in which they operate allows 
it– business mergers or acquisitions to reduce their exposure to risk.  
  
In this way, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become since the mid-1990s an integral part of 
the strategic initiatives of many media groups that want to expand their presence in other markets, to 
capitalise on technological developments or consolidate themselves in the industry in which they 
operate (Chan-Olmsted, 1998). 
  
The potential benefits that result from a merger or acquisition are the elimination of inefficient 
operations and, therefore, the achievement of greater economies of scale. In some cases –Walt 
Disney Co., News Corp., Vivendi– the objective of M&A is vertical, horizontal, global, and all-
around expansion, to maximise the full potential of companies by being present throughout the value 
chain. In other cases –especially in local markets– the focus is simply to create economies of scale 
and to reduce the number of players in the market. 
  
Although in the field of economic theory there are a good number of studies which purport to explain 
the causes that lead to corporate vertical integration, very few of these studies have taken into 
account how public policies can encourage this type of integration (Mendi et alt., 2011): an 
integration that is motivated by strategic reasons, with the creation of mechanisms that allow the 
parent company to discipline the target companies and improve their profitability. Horizontal 
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integration strategies allow companies operating in the same field of activity to increase their 
presence in these markets and to substantially increase their market share (Peltier, 2004). 
  
In both cases, the incentives to absorb other firms include the tax benefits derived of the integration, 
in addition to the creation of contents capable of generating abundant economies of scale. Alfaro et 
al. (2010) highlight the existence of a positive relationship between integrations of these 
characteristics and tariff protection. On the contrary, Nocke and White (2007) have proposed the idea 
that this type of strategies, especially the vertical type, can facilitate agreements between domestic 
oligopolies. In any case, several factors complicate the “fusion” of companies: asymmetries in costs, 
elasticity and demand fluctuations, barriers to entry, and competition in variables other than price. 
  
The media industry has an inherent tendency to ownership concentration and vertical and horizontal 
integration (Vogel, 2004). But while vertical integration aims to gain business presence throughout 
the value chain –from the acquisition of information to distribution and marketing services–
,horizontal integration essentially seeks to create economies of scale, with the consequent reduction 
of running costs; the achievement of a greater critical mass and an increase in the market share. Both 
types of integration can reduce the transaction costs that take place in the heart of the companies; and 
mitigate the uncertainty of demand and the consequent risk aversion. 
  
However, the most worrying consequence of these external growth processes is that the high 
concentration of media companies can endanger the pluralism of information and audiences’ 
independent elections.  
  
Doyle (2003: 11) points out that the definition of pluralism refers to the diversity of both ownership 
and contents. In other words, in more concentrated market structures there is the danger that the key 
players will restrict the number of voices that participate in the dissemination of information, 
opinions, and values (Faustino, 2010), which goes against the pluralism of ideas. Some authors, such 
as George (2007), have found empirical evidence between the degree of concentration and the 
thematic variety of the press in North America. 
  
Likewise, it should be noted that the access to information is a right recognised in the Spanish 
Constitution, whereas pluralism, which must govern the media, has also obtained the recognition of 
the European authorities. Thus, the European Parliament has already indicated that ownership 
concentration in the media system complicates the entry of new players in the market and encourages 
greater uniformity of content. Moreover, the European Commission has developed a series of 
directives to standardise the legislation of the Member States to ensure economic freedom [1].  
  
Media pluralism is not only a fundamental value of the democratic system (Tomás Olalla, 2004). It 
also manifests itself in the guarantee of citizens’ access to a plurality of independent media and 
contents, and is a concept supported by UNESCO, which adopted the Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005. In the same way, the European 
Commission’s 1992 green paper supports the free flow of information. And the European Parliament 
has already pointed out that media concentration creates an environment that favours the 
monopolisation of the advertising market and brings greater uniformity in terms of content.  
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The protection of pluralism in this case constitutes a common reference in the communication 
policies of the major democratic countries and the defence of pluralism in the media is a basic 
principle in these democracies (Bas et al., 2011). 
 
 
2. Research hypotheses and objectives 
 
The initial hypothesis is that the free-to-air TV market in Spain has gone from being an oligopoly, in 
which four large networks co-existed –with RTVE (the Spanish Radio y Television Corporation) and 
other public service regional channels– to a duopoly formed by two large television platforms that 
control a good part of the revenue in the television market, about 90% of advertising, and just under 
50% of the audience share.  
  
Such conjectural proposition is based on the idea that the duopoly formed by both television 
platforms does not only constitute a threat to pluralism in the media, but can also play an important 
role in the survival of free-to-air public and private TV corporations, and even in the future of radio 
companies, and print and online publications.  
  
The objectives of this article are to establish, first, whether this concentration may hinder the 
development of commercial television in Spain by restricting competition and the entry of new 
competitors and, second, whether the recommendations of the CNC (Spain’s National Competition 
Commission) are successful in their analysis of both concentrations deals, given the absence of an 
Audiovisual Council to judge these policies. 
 
  
3. Method and approach 
 
This study is based on the principles of the political economy of communication (PEC). According to 
V. Mosco (1996), the EPC provides an integrated theoretical framework to address the power 
relationships that determine the forms of production, distribution and consumption of resources and, 
therefore, focuses on media ownership and concentration. According to F. Sierra (2013), the 
prevailing trends in the culture industry require research studies to examine the relations between the 
government, the market, the media corporations, the industrial concentration, the public policies and 
the economic development.  
  
The ultimate goal would be to generate sufficient knowledge to establish socially viable alternatives 
to the democratic control of information through the analysis of the ownership structure of the media 
and the producers of technology and cultural contents, and the analysis of the economic and financial 
logics and their influence on the creation and commercial dynamics of communication. 
  
Instead of focusing on the main television companies operating in the Spanish market, this study is 
based on the analysis of two very relevant cases of M&A in Spain, involving the two major free-to-
air television companies (with important participation in pay television): Telecinco and Antena 3.  
  
The study is based on two specific methods: the case study method and the analysis of the legal-
corporate aspects of the media concentration processes (Pérez Serrano, 2008) which, usually, takes 
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into account the following elements: the economic structure of the media group, society, and the 
business unit that leads the concentration process. 
  
The difficulty to establish quantitative parameters has led us to choose the analysis of the ownership 
concentration and the distribution of the social capital of the communication companies as the main 
sources of information, without ignoring other factors such as the audience concentration derived 
from the reduction of media companies, advertising investment and the impact of technology in the 
expectations of concentration. 
  
This study has fundamentally focused on the analysis of the concentration of revenue in the free-to-
air television companies; the advertising market and audiences; as well as the control of contents, 
although in this last aspect pay TV companies (mainly Prisa TV) has the largest number of output-
deals signed with the major American film studios and the distribution rights of sports broadcasts. In 
the same way, the study has taken into account the effects of the legislation and policies applied by 
the different executives, including the Law on the Funding of RTVE Corporation, and the strategies 
of the regional television corporations in a context of crisis [2]. 
  
For this research we reviewed the annual reports of the CMT (Spain’s Telecommunications Market 
Commission); the advertising revenue figures provided by Infoadex; and the TV audience figures 
provided by Barlovento Comunicación, with data from Kantar Media. Also very useful for the study 
were the resolutions issued by the CNC on the acquisitions of Cuatro by Telecinco and La Sexta by 
Antena 3. Other sources of reference are the resolutions of the European Commission and the 
analysis of the income statements of the largest Spanish media groups (Atresmedia, Mediaset 
España, Prisa, Vocento and Mediapro) and RTVE.  
  
Over the last twenty years many scholars have addressed the reasons which have provoked M&A in 
the cultural industries. Bagdikian’s 1997 work (The media monopoly), which developed the 
intellectual framework that influenced many media scholars [3], was followed by studies focused on 
specific geographical areas.  
  
Most of these studies are based on the principles of the Political Economy of Communication and 
industrial economics [4]. A significant part of this academic literature refers to legal issues (anti-trust 
policies) or the analysis of the strategies of horizontal, vertical and conglomerate integration. These 
studies include those carried out by Ahn and Litman (1997), Albarran (2010), Brick and Edelvod 
(2009), Croteau and Hoynes (2001), Cunninghan and Alexander (2004), Mastrini and Becerra 
(2012), McChesney (2002), Noam (2009), Picard (1996) and Winseck (2008). 
  
There are also a handful of Spanish scholars who have been addressing these subject matters since 
the 1990s, either from a more general or, in some cases, tangential perspective of the processes of 
concentration in Spain. A good part of these scholars focus on the ownership concentration processes 
(oligopolistic or monopolistic situations) that are capable of altering competition and the pluralism of 
information. However, the effects of advertising investment on pluralism and the consequences 





Revista Latina de Comunicación Social # 069 – Pages 390 to 417  
Investigation | DOI: 10.4185/RLCS-2014-1017en | ISSN 1138-5820 | Year 2014 
 
 
 http://www.revistalatinacs.org/069/paper/1017_UC3/20ven.html                 Página 395 
4. The Spanish television market 
 
Following the adoption of the 1988 Private television law - in force until 1 May 2010 - the first half 
of the 1990s was characterised by a strong recession in advertising investment and a high increase in 
content price after the emergence of the new television operators. As a result, television companies 
have performed poorly (Artero, Herrero and Sánchez-Tabernero, 2005) [5].  
 
However, in the second half of the 1990s, private networks became profitable thanks to the recovery 
of the world economy, the advent of technology companies and the reduction of their high debt. 
However, after the analogue switch-off of April 2010, it seemed clear that the television ecosystem 
would undergo profound changes: more channels and more companies participating in the free-to-air 
television market.  
  
A total of 24 national private channels and eight channels owned by the RTVE Corporation and the 
arrival of new competitors (Vocento, Mediapro and Unedisa) faced serious problems to coexist and 
survive, including the five mainstream networks and Canal+, in the Spanish TV advertising market, 
which was previously reduced in terms of players, and in a non-expansive economic framework. In 
the words of Zallo (2010: 53), when the government allowed the launching of new channels it did 
not take into account the effects of the competition nor the resulting “television superabundance”: 
more than 1,200 TV channels. 
  
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the television market in Spain was characterised by the financial 
decline of RTVE and the good results of the main private channels (Bustamante, 2009). Up until the 
implementation of DTT, the analogue television business model did not seem overly complex. 
Advertising revenues compensated the costs of infrastructure and production. But from April 2010 
[6], a series of variables jointly transformed the television model in Spain: to the high fixed costs 
necessary to preserve digital licenses, was joined by the progressive fragmentation of audiences; the 
threats of pay TV and its output deals with the major American film studios and exploitation of 
sports broadcasting rights. 
  
During this period it was impossible for many networks to find viable business models in the era of 
audiences hyper-fragmentation (Bustamante, 2009), primarily due to the broad dominance enjoyed 
by the large mainstream networks and the dominance of pay TV channels in the premium content 
market. Thus, the principle that a significant increase in the number of free-to-air and pay TV 
channels also entails an increase in the price of the most desirable contents was met; and this became 
evident in the sports broadcasting rights which reached exorbitant prices in the 1990s (Artero, 





Thus, the Spanish television market, since the emergence of DTT and the rise of the thematic 
channels, moved in a seemingly insoluble contradiction: apart from the four large mainstream 
channels -and RTVE- the rest of the television companies only obtained enough advertising revenue 
to survive. Advertisers –although unhappy about the high rates imposed by the large mainstream 
networks– wanted to reach mass audiences, and both free DTT channels and thematic channels had 
small audiences and reduced coverage in most of the major autonomous communities.  
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The immediate consequence has been the failure of such channels as Veo TV (which was closed 
down in 2011 and whose three channels were put up for lease), the closure of Canal 10 and its 
cession to Paramount Channel, and the transformation of Marca TV in a home shopping TV channel 
(2013). For their part, the free thematic channels, which had a reduced advertising portfolio, 
generally offered little attractive contents to the audience [7]. 
  
In 2012, the evolution of the audience shares across the media groups was as follows: Mediaset 
España had reached 28.1% of the audience, followed by Atresmedia with 25.8%, and RTVE with 
18.9%. The most important fact was that the audience share of both private groups increased in 
comparison to the year 2011, while that of RTVE dropped from 22.3% to 18.9%. 
 
 
Table 1. Audience share evolution in the main free-to-air TV channels during the duration of 
the two concentration processes under analysis (2009-2012) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own creation based on data from Infoadex, 2009-2012 
  
 
In terms of advertising sales in 2012, according to Infoadex, the national free-to-air TV networks 
earned a total of 1,643.9 million (compared to 1,977 in 2011) and the two large platforms reached 
together almost 90% of the total revenue, while the regional television companies had a revenue of 
126.8 billion and the pay TV channels had a revenue of 43.1 million euros. In this way, in 2012, 
Antena 3 and La Sexta earned 754 million euros and Mediaset España a total of 821.5 million euros; 
i.e. together the two groups had a revenue of 1,575.5 million euros, and attracted 86.8% of all 
advertising investment in television, which amounted 85.4% in the previous year [8].  
  
That is why stock market investors bought shares of Mediaset and Atresmedia. In the case of 
Mediaset it was due to its healthy balance sheet, the generation of cash surpluses and good 
remuneration to shareholders while, in the case of Atresmedia, it was due to its absence of debt and 
its good prospects, although its majority shareholder, the Planeta group, had renegotiated a debt of 
700 million euros with its bank lenders. 
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However, the medium of television attracted 60% of all the advertising investment in conventional 
media, excluding outdoor advertising and on the Internet, which is a trend that tends to increase in 
each fiscal year. This seems to suggest that there is a clear displacement of advertising in 
conventional media (newspapers, Sunday supplements, cinema, radio and magazines) and even in the 
regional TV corporations towards the large mainstream TV channels, which are capable of reaching 
any region in Spain. With the exception of Puerto Rico and Uruguay (Lanza and Buquet, 2011), there 
does not seem to exist other examples of such a clear advertising concentration. Territorial control, 




Table 2. The free-to-air TV advertising market in Spain (2009-2011)  
  
 
Source: CNC, 2012 
  
 
Table 3. Advertising investment in conventional media (in million euros) (2009-2012)  
  
 
Source: Author’s own creation based on own information and data from Infoadex 
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Therefore, and, apart from both platforms, currently there does not seem to exist a single viable 
business model of free-to-air television that is not experimenting a large concentration process. A 
business model must describe the way an organisation creates, provides, and captures value. It must 
describe the products and services, the value proposition that it offers to its customers and how it will 
be able to generate new revenues to remain a profitable company. But instead of talking about 
“business models”, in this case we should talk of “business solutions”. However, these solutions 
currently involve a higher degree of corporate concentration to seize control of the main source of 
income of the free-to-air television companies: advertising.  
  
In any case, the structuring of duopolies and oligopolies, endorsed by the different government 
legislations –and thereby the reduction of the offer– seems to be a constant that many democratic 
countries apply in their media policies. 
  
In the Spanish case, apart from the characteristics of its media system there exists a weak regulatory 
framework, based on constant and hyper-fragmented reforms and counter-reforms: the 2009 Law on 
Urgent Measures in Telecommunications (Ley 7/2009, of 3 July); the 2009 Law on the Funding of 
the RTVE Corporation (Ley 8/2009, of 28 August); the 2010 General Law on Audiovisual 
Communication (Ley 7/2010, of 31 March); the 2012 Royal Decree-Law amending the Management 
system of the RTVE Corporation (Real Decreto Ley 15/2012, of 20 April); and the 2012 Law on 
Management relaxation for regional public service TV channels (Ley 6/2012, of 1 August).  
  
Many of these regulations have encouraged greater concentration, whenever possible, in the sector. 
In fact, the policy changes carried out in 2009 [9] immediately led to strategic actions aimed at 
achieving the concentration of private television channels (Alcolea and Pérez Serrano, 2013). 
  
A final reflection on the Spanish television market would also have to consider the role played by 
RTVE throughout this process. After proposing a reform for public television, apparently very 
similar to the one approved in 2008 in France [10], but radically different in the control of 
management bodies, RTVE acquired a new funding framework that had more restrictive budgets and 
the suppression of advertising.  
  
And, while RTVE could initially be the leader in audiences, due to the quality of its programming 
and the absence of advertising interruptions, after various changes in its organisational structure and 
the reduction of its own production and sports rights, from 2012 onwards RTVE was relegated to the 
third place, behind Telecinco and Antena 3. Apparently, RTVE’s executive did not consider it was 
essential for the public broadcaster to play a decisive balancing role in the Spanish television market. 
 
  
5. Results of the concentration process 
5.1. Analysis of the external growth processes  
5.1.1. The absorption of Cuatro by Telecinco 
 
The absorption of Cuatro by Telecinco was the first concentration deal between television channels 
in Spain after the policy changes of 2009 and 2010. In late 2009 both companies signed a term sheet 
to merge, which was completed the signing of an integration agreement and a framework agreement 
in April 2010. 
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In this process [11], as well as in the one agreed upon between Antena 3 and La Sexta, the involved 
entities and the European Commission and the CNC identified the sectors and markets that were 
affected and the restrictions on competition which were being produced. Table 4 highlights the most 
important data on the merger:  
 
 
able 4. Essential data on the Telecinco/Cuatro merger  
 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
 Based on the previous data, in October 2010, Telecinco submitted for the second time the conditions 
that would govern the merger, which this time were regarded as sufficient by the CNC. The 
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conditions finally proposed by Telecinco made reference to the offer of free-to-air channels, the 
advertising market and the negotiating position in the purchase of content. The CNC considered that 
the conditions presented by Telecinco limited its business autonomy in the management of TV 
advertising and the purchasing of audiovisual content, which allowed it to compensate for the 
competition problems generated by the concentration. Table 5 summarises the conditions that 
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Table 5. Conditions agreed upon for the authorisation of the Telecinco/Cuatro merger 
  
  
Source: Author’s own creation 
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The CNC set the duration of these conditions to three years, extendable to two more years, if the 
market conditions that made them necessary persist. The agreement did not become part of the 
agenda of the Council of Ministers and the exclusive takeover of Cuatro by Telecinco was executed 
on 28 December, 2010.  
  







Source: Author’s own creation 
 
As shown in Figure 1, at the time of the merger, the outcome of the process involved an income of 
952 million euros, eight DTT channels (now seven), two free-to-air channels and 25% of the 
audience.   
  
Figure 2. Value of the absorption (2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own creation with data from the statement of both platforms 
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 The new company, with a value of 2,980 million euros, is a share capital structure in which 
Mediaset owns a 41.6% share and PRISA a 18.4% share.  
  
  






Source: Author’s own creation 
  
    
Figure 4. The Mediaset España Group (year 2012) 
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 The CNC continued monitoring the consequences of this process. In April 2012, the Investigation 
Direction sent the Council of the CNC a report on the degree of compliance with the Resolution that 
authorised the merging of both operators. The report concluded that Mediaset had failed to meet, in a 
systematic and repeated manner, the different deadlines set out in the Action Plan of 23 February, 
2011. In particular, Mediaset failed to provide certain information, necessary to assess the fulfilment 
of the conditions relating to the TV advertising market and the audiovisual content. 
  
The Commission eventually initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding and imposed a 
penalty of 15.6 million euros to Mediaset for committing a very serious breach of various conditions, 
relating to the marketing of advertising spaces, contractual restrictions on the acquisition of content 
and the obligation to provide information to verify and ensure compliance with the conditions. 
  
5.1.2. The absorption of La Sexta by Antena 3 
 
Table 6. Essential data on the Antena 3/La Sexta merger 
  
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
Revista Latina de Comunicación Social # 069 – Pages 390 to 417  
Investigation | DOI: 10.4185/RLCS-2014-1017en | ISSN 1138-5820 | Year 2014 
 
 
 http://www.revistalatinacs.org/069/paper/1017_UC3/20ven.html                 Página 405 
 This process began on 30 December when the CNC was notified that Antena 3 was absorbing La 
Sexta, through the acquisition of 100% of its share capital. After filing this procedure (after the 
European Commission highlighted the community dimension of this operation, which the parties 
involved had not contemplated) and opening a new one, the CNC determined, in March 2012, the 
beginning of the second phase of the procedure on the grounds that the operation could hinder the 
maintenance of effective competition at all or any of the markets under consideration. 
  
In addition, as table 6 shows, in its analysis of the first phase, the CNC concluded that this operation 
affected primarily the TV advertising market, as well as the audiovisual contents of the free-to-air 
TV market. In the case of the TV advertising market, the disappearance of La Sexta as independent 
provider of advertising space (which would be managed by Antena 3) reinforced the power of the 
Planeta network over advertisers. This fact could allow Mediaset and Antena 3 to act in a 
coordinated manner to the detriment of competition. Regarding the acquisition of audiovisual 
content, the entity resulting from the merger of Antena 3 and La Sexta could also strengthen its 
bargaining power. 
  
Regarding pluralism of information on television, a report of the SETSI noted that this concentration 
would have no effect on it and was compliant with article 36 of the 2012 General Law on 
Audiovisual communication (Ley 7/2010, of 31 March).  
  
The concentration of Antena 3 and La Sexta was finally authorised by the CNC, with conditions, on 
13 July, 2012. In this case, Antena 3 presented three successive proposals to resolve the competition 
problems, which the Investigation Direction deemed insufficient to compensate for the existing 
obstacles for the maintenance of effective competition. For this reason, the CNC’s Investigation 
Direction itself established the conditions for the authorisation of this operation. It was determined 
that these conditions would have a duration of five years. 
 
Subsequently, on 27 August 2012, the Council of Ministers amended these conditions. Antena 3 had 
reported as relevant fact to the Commission, the unviability to maintain the conditions imposed by 
the agency. The executive argued that there were circumstances of general interest, essentially 
related to the guarantee of a proper maintenance of the objectives of the sectoral regulation, as well 
as of the promotion of research and technological development.  
  
With regards to the sectoral objectives, the executive referred to the objectives of the sectoral 
regulation of electronic communications (to guarantee the implementation of the Liberation Plan of 
the 'digital dividend') and those related to the audiovisual sector (to guarantee pluralism in the 
media). 
  
The resolution of the Council of Ministers kept the points noted by the CNC on the conditions on 
free-to-air TV and on the acquisition of audiovisual content, but partly modified the obligations of 
periodic presentation of information and, substantially, the conditions on TV advertising, 
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Source: Author’s own creation 
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 The agreement of the Council of Ministers included the opinion of Antena 3. The network had 
publicly expressed that the conditions imposed by the CNC –in relation to the advertising market– 
were discriminatory, more severe, more restrictive, and included more obligations that those imposed 
to Antena 3 in relation to Mediaset. Therefore, the Council concluded that the removal of the “main 
asymmetries” introduced between the two TV operators, as a result of the obligations included in the 
first and fifth conditions of the CNC, would eliminate the identified obstacles to the integration 
between Antena 3 and La Sexta in favour of the assurance of the sectoral objectives.  
 
The unrest in the advertising industry, in the midst of a major crisis, was clear. In fact, in late 2012, 
the Spanish Advertisers Association (AEA) appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision to 
downgrade the conditions imposed by the CNC to the merger of Antena 3 and La Sexta.  
  
However, in early 2013, and following an agreement with Antena 3, the appeal was retracted, after 
Planeta’s network pledged to accept the conditions imposed by the CNC to guarantee competition in 
the TV sector in Spain, provided that they did not result in distorting effects on the market. Antena 3 
meant accepting the new conditions of the CNC in case this agency decided to impose more severe 
conditions to the merger of Telecinco and Cuatro.  
  
Figure 5. Result of the concentration of Antena 3 and La Sexta 
Source: Author’s own creation 
  
The process culminated formally on 1 October 2012, with the economic results shown in Figure 5. 
Shareholders of La Sexta received a 7% stake in the share capital of Antena 3, with the option of 
acquiring a larger share, according to the achievement of unspecified objectives throughout 2016. 
“The Antena 3 platform, then, had a market value of 2,180 million euros, according to the due 
diligence carried out by the banks, which valued La Sexta at 1,680 million euros and Antena 3 at 500 








39.5  mill. €
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Figure 6. Value of the concentration (in 2012) 
 
Source: Author’s own creation with data from Atresmedia’s statement 
  
On March 6, 2013, the Antena 3 group changed its name to Atresmedia Corporation, and on 24 April 
it changed its corporate name to Atresmedia Corporación de Medios de Comunicación, Sociedad 
Anónima. Figure 7 shows the shareholding structure of the media group: 
  
Figure 7. Atresmedia Group (2012) 
 
Source: Author’s own creation with data from Atresmedia 
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In addition, the holding company linked to La Sexta is Imagina Media Audiovisual. This group was 
created in 2006 with the integration of the production companies Grupo Globomedia (formerly 
Grupo Árbol) and Mediapro, which from October 2012 has contributed to the current configuration 
of its direct competitor of Mediaset España.  
  
Figure 8. Imagine Audiovisual Media within the new Antena 3 (Atresmedia) 
 





Both concentration processes were, from the business point of view, clear economic motivations, 
which have had significant consequences for the situation of the Spanish TV industry and, more 
generally, for the whole media industry in Spain.  
 
Regarding the causes that originated these takeovers, both Telecinco and Antena 3 wanted to 
increase their size and to create greater economies of scale to mitigate the audience decline that 
occurred from 2006, the decrease in revenue and profits caused by the economic recession, but also 
by a greater competition framework in which the number of competitors had created an oversupply 
in the advertising market. In other words, the creation of this new duopoly has managed to limit 
rivalry in the television offer, and at a time when the broadcasting model is failing to reach the 
audience levels it reached in the past. 
  
The reality is that, based on advertising revenue figures and the opinion of the Spanish Advertisers 
Association (AEA), a better segmented market has not been achieved for the advertising targets. As 
all the companies involved have agreed, television production has become even more concentrated, 
by eliminating or damaging independent producers. Competition in the audiovisual production 
markets, both in the production of TV series and news programmes, has been further reduced, which 
puts the access to the premium content demanded by viewers on the hands of fewer providers. 
  
On the other hand, the selling of the acquired companies (Cuatro and La Sexta), which were owned 
by media groups, has shown that the high indebtedness of their parent companies (Prisa and 
Mediapro) [12], which was part of their strategy of vertical integration and premium content 
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acquisition to maintain their supremacy in the free-to-air and pay TV market (Canal+ and Gol TV), 
has failed and they have had to be acquired by two other large hardly-indebted communication 
groups [13].  
  
Table 8. Comparison of the concentration processes under analysis 
 
 
Source: Author’s own creation 
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Although there is not a clear correlation between the creation of this TV duopoly and the drift of 
RTVE -and there is an absence of a more detailed study about this particular case-, it can be 
concluded that there has been a shift between the advertising commercialised by the public national 
network and the two large private networks, as noted by the CNC itself (see Table 2). 
  
Figure 9. Distribution of Spain’s TV advertising market (2012)  
 
Source: Author’s own creation with data from Infoadex 
  
The facts that RTVE was given a new funding framework and that its budgets were more restrictive 
from 2010 until today, has forced this public entity to decrease its own production and get rid of 
some of its expensive sports broadcasting rights. As a result of these and other factors, TVE has lost 
its audience leadership in favour of Telecinco and Antena 3. And, above all, it ceased to be a 
counterweight to the dominance of Mediaset España and Atresmedia. 
  
Regarding the resolutions dictated by the CNC throughout this processes, there has been a lack of a 
body to regulate the market, which had been considered in the 2010 General Law on Audiovisual 
Communication. That is why the CNC had to assume certain powers which, elsewhere in the 
European Union, corresponded to the European Commission.  
  
There are also significant differences in the way CNC resolved both operations. Once the first 
absorption, of Cuatro by Telecinco, was approved, it became clear for this body that the authorisation 
of the absorption of La Sexta by Antena 3 could seriously distort the television market in Spain.  
  
Thus, the conditions attached to the authorisation of the concentration process were more severe than 
those attached to the merging of Telecinco in two areas: the one regarding the television advertising 
market (such as the obligation to maintain two companies to sell advertising and the limitations on 
joint bids exceeding 18% of total audience) and the one regarding the period of duration of the 
conditions (the five-year duration against three years extendable for two more imposed to Mediaset). 
However, the Council of Ministers, making use of powers given to it by the law in this matter, 
modified such conditions claiming circumstances of general interest and arguing the elimination of 
the main asymmetries existing between the two private TV operators were necessary.  
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These asymmetries had been defended as necessary by the CNC, because although the markets under 
analysis were the same in both cases, the market conditions were different. The CNC has pointed out, 
among other things, that the fact that the television advertising market could not be value in the same 
way because the number of providers had gone from four to two operators, which had generated 
major problems of competition, which had to be compensated with more strict solutions.  
  
Finally, and from a strictly financial point of view, the merging of Antena 3 was most advantageous 
than that of Telecinco, because the former profited –since the negotiations stretched in time– from 
the deterioration of the Spanish economy, which was the biggest weakness of the advertising demand 
and the financial situation of Mediapro. 
  
Thus, while the sale of 100% of the capital of Cuatro and 22% of the capital of Digital+ amounted to 
488 million euros plus 18.1% of the new Mediaset España (about 550 million euros at market price), 
the sale of La Sexta to Antena 3 meant the acceptance of the liabilities of the network (and the 
corresponding tax benefits) and a transfer of 7% of the capital, but without the need to pay any 
money or resorting to an increase in capital which ultimately ended up reducing the value of the 
merger. 
  
In the same way, Mediaset did not have to resort to any loan to carry out the purchase: it simply 
proceeded to extend the capital and to transfer to the Prisa group a percentage of the capital of the 
network which could be sold within one year. And the same thing happened with Antena 3, which 
has delayed the execution of the remaining 7% of the capital of the company until certain 
assumptions are met. 
  
Regarding managerial style, the resolution of both operations has clearly demonstrated the mastery 
of the communication corporations (Mediaset and Planeta) over the Spanish broadcasters 
(Mediapro), which were born under the protection of the creation of the regional television 
corporations. 
  
And with regards to the pluralism of information and the diversity of content, it seems necessary to 
carry out further investigations after a considerable number of years have passed. However, it seems 
evident that from 2010, the year of the first concentration deal, to this day, there has been greater 
concentration in terms of audience, provision of premium content and attraction of advertising 
contracts, as well as a very restricted market for the rest of the free-to-air TV networks, whose 
chances of survival have been more compromised, as evidenced by the abandonment or the freezing 
of the television projects of Unedisa and Vocento and the serious crisis affecting the regional 




-Start of research: May 2011 
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7. Notes 
 
1. Including the Television Without Frontiers Directive 97/36/EC, the Access Directive 2002/19/EC 
and the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. 
  
2. In any case, when the required time has passed, further research studies should determine the way 
in which reduction of channels has affected television programming.  
  
3. This author has argued that a handful of moguls had been created in the communications industry, 
forming a new “cartel” of media companies in the United States. 
  
4. Douglas Gomery has played a pioneering role in the economic and industrial analysis of the 
cultural industries based on the classical microeconomic theory. In this regard, an important study is 
the one he carried out with Benjamin Compaine: Who owns the media (2000). 
  
5. Antena 3 obtained a negative net result of 15.400 million pesetas (92.5 thousand Euros), Telecinco 
of 4,760 billion pesetas (28.6 thousand Euros) and Canal Plus of 13,428 billion pesetas (80.7 
thousand Euros). However, during the 1990s the television market moved more than 25,000 million 
euros in revenue. 
  
6. However, 2009 is in fact the first year in which the sum of the three main television channels 
reached historic lows. 
  
7. La preponderance of the platforms owned by Mediaset España and Atresmedia is such that, apart 
from the large national radio stations, no medium is able to guarantee a high audience level to the 
major advertisers in Spain. 
  
8. It is important to mention the collapse of the regional television companies, which only obtained 
126.8 million Euros in revenue, losing one third of its revenue with respect to 2011. 
  
9. 2009 Royal Decree-Law on Urgent Measures in Telecommunications Matters (Real Decreto-Ley 
1/2009, of 23 February), which was later ratified as Law in 2009 (Ley 7/2009, of 3 July).  
  
10. To analyse in detail this reform see La Documentation Française, 2008. In Spain, the general-
interest private channels were the main beneficiaries of the nearly 400 million euros that RTVE 
stopped receiving. In return, these channels have to provide 3% of their annual income, which 
accounted for a total of 44.7 million euros in 2013.  
  
11. It is important to note that the CNC jointly took into account this operation and the acquisition of 
Prisa by Telefonica and Telecinco of a 22% share each in the social capital of Digital+, together with 
veto rights on the business plan and the annual budget of Digital+ (European Commission, 2010b: 
4.17). 
  
12. By the end of 2010, the debt of Prisa group amounted to 3.2 billion Euros, while Mediapro and 
subsidiaries (Mediaproducción S.L.) had a debt of around 2,500 million Euros, arising mainly from 
the acquisition of sports rights. 
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13 Mediaset España had virtually no debts, despite the losses produced by the acquisition of 
Endemol, while Antena 3 was in the same situation; not so its majority shareholder, the Planeta 
group, which had a debt of about 900 million euros after refinancing all of its debts, which included 
the purchase of the French publisher Editis.  
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